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“It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you
know for sure that just ain’t so.”
−Mark Twain

Introduction
In most of my decades-long teaching and professorial career, I primarily
taught Torts, but never Contracts. However, last year, I agreed to teach
jointly a postgraduate class of 35 students on “Civil Obligations.” It was a
decision that conformed to one of the more unsettling tropes of my life—
“act in haste, repent at leisure.” My role in this arrangement was, after a
general opening about the nature of civil obligations and the interface of
Contract and Tort, to assume responsibility for the Contracts component of
the course. This presented itself as a considerable task, but I thought that it
would be a new and refreshing challenge. And I was right. In preparing for
and teaching contract law, I learned (and unlearned) more about law, legal
thinking and teaching than I had originally bargained for or reasonably
expected.
In this essay, I reflect on that experience and offer some insights that
I came to realize (and perhaps re-realize) through teaching the course: it
gave me a chance to explore and question some of the settled ideas that
I had about law, legal thinking and teaching. Of course, this meant that I
had to be more open to different viewpoints than I usually am or, at least,
more than many would think I am capable of. After all, my stances on law,
legal thinking and teaching have accumulated over almost 40 years and, as
a result, have become (too?) entrenched. I have clear opinions on various
matters that have become fixed and unquestioned in my jurisprudential
*
Distinguished Research Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada.
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worldview. But a significant part of those views was my commitment to
the idea that there is no solid ground on which to stand; everything is
always shifting and changing. So, with that sobering thought in mind, I
went about the demanding undertaking of trying to put up for scrutiny and
critique many of the ingrained shibboleths that have informed my work.
In short, I followed the advice of Star Wars’ wise Yoda—sometimes “you
must unlearn what you have learned.”
In that critical spirit, I intended to stir up some ground that I had left
undisturbed for a long time. I do not pretend that I managed to do this
completely or successfully. Nevertheless, the effort was worth it. At a bare
minimum, this experience made me unlearn some of my long-held ideas
about law, legal thinking and teaching. In the process, I modified those
thoughts so that they rang a little truer and were not merely a repetitious
recital of unexamined and complacent ideas. Accordingly, after talking
about the challenges of teaching new courses, I will move on to deal with
the role of economic morality in contracts law, the relationship between
contracts and tort law, and the political dynamics of contract law’s
development. Throughout the essay, my ambition is to ask many (and
attempt to answer some) of the underlying questions that frame law, legal
thinking and teaching.
I. Starting anew again
In the first place, agreeing to teach Contracts reminded me of the challenge
that younger colleagues face in working up a course and teaching it. Those
are fraught times in almost all professors’ careers. New courses involve
skating on thin ice and, if truth be told, a number of slip-and-slide tumbles.
In that sense, teaching a new course was a humbling process. I travelled
back in time to my own early teaching days and felt again some of the
angst that most teachers go through as they ready themselves to face their
students; an unwelcome experience of the imposter syndrome resulted.
There are few places to hide at the front of a class as your knowledge
and learning is put to the test. Perhaps, more accurately, it where there
is nowhere to hide when the gaps and evasions in your knowledge are
exposed for all to see; you are naked out there.
As well as boning up on the substance and subtleties of the topic in
hand, there is the considerable burden of working out what kind of teacher
you want to be or, at least, want to try to be. When I began teaching, I knew
that there had to be a better way to instruct than the “dictation sessions”
I had been brought up on. I wanted students to think that there might be
some reason to come to class and not simply crib notes from somebody
else. Indeed, when I attended the Inns of Court School of Law in the mid-
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1970s, this style of teaching was given a tragi-comic twist. The teacher
(a celebrated Oxford Don) announced that he could not be at class the
following week, but that the class would continue nonetheless. A little
puzzled by this, we arrived late that day and had to sit in a spill-over room
where there was normally a TV with a live-action video on screen of the
teacher in the main classroom. However, that week, the teacher had sent
in an audio-spool, which was being played by a tape-recorder placed on
the desk at the front of the room. In our spill-over room, we sat through
a class of watching a video of that tape-player and hearing it through the
speakers. This now hard-to-believe scenario spoke volumes about the
state-of-the-art approach and underlying pedagogical thinking of English
law teachers.1
After a couple of years teaching in England, I came to Osgoode. I
knew what I did not want to be, but had not settled on what I did want
to be; I had little sense of the pedagogic possibilities. Early in my first
semester, I was walking down the corridor and heard a voice booming out
from a classroom. I peered in and saw Harry Glasbeek who was pacing
up and down the aisles, sometimes speaking sotto voce and other times
bellowing to the class. This was and remains an epiphanic moment for
me. After attending a couple of Harry’s lectures, I realized that, if I could
not quite be Harry, I could at least be whomever I wanted to be. He had
opened my eyes and mind to the possibilities that teaching offered. And
it was not simply his style, but also his content that inspired me. Students
may or may not have liked what Harry did or said, but they could not
ignore him; he engaged the students and confronted them. There were
no fences to sit on in Harry’s class; he challenged students to question
themselves and their deepest understanding about what law is and what it
could be. He was a bravura performer.
Most importantly, my recent experience reminded me that teaching is
as much about learning as it is about sharing one’s learning with others.
Indeed, there are few better ways to learn about a subject than doing the
work required to be able to get up in front of a class and teach it. For
that reason, even the most experienced of professors should make the
occasional decision to teach a course that they have never taught or even
studied before. It offers the opportunity to challenge oneself and to be more
sympathetic to the plight of less seasoned colleagues. The benefits of doing
1.
This was not the only eccentric teacher or colleague I had—the almost fall out the window one;
the world’s largest collector of plastic bags; the one who knowingly taught law that had been replaced
by a new legislative scheme; the one who lived and slept undiscovered at the law school for a long
period; and the one who complained that the students interfered with us doing our job properly, to
name but a few.
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so far outweigh the costs of taking on new courses. Also, I realized that,
over the years, I had developed a wide range of strategies—part lecture,
part Socratic engagement, part stand-up comedy, and part confrontation—
to cover up and present a front of calm and covered composure to the
sceptical class. Indeed, I also understood better the notion that, as you
get older, the class is more willing to give you the benefit of the doubt by
assuming that you are wiser than you are.
In agreeing to teach a new course, my basic gamble was that what
I lacked in substantive knowledge about the law of contracts would be
more than offset by what I knew about law and teaching generally. There
was some validity to this conceit. In reading and scrutinizing cases that I
had never read before, I was able to rely on a strong sense of what kinds
of arguments and reasoning were relied on by judges; I had developed a
critical facility for reading and understanding cases. However, I knew that
the common complaint about my teaching was that I tended to want the
students to run before they could walk: I moved too quickly to a critical
reaction to cases and principles before I had sufficiently laid out the basic
take-aways from judgments and explained the rules to be gleaned from
them. So this seemed a good occasion to try to remedy that. I would do a
little more lecturing than I usually did and try to hold down on the editorial
posture.
Rather than use a casebook for the course, I opted to designate a
text book—John McCamus’s The Law of Contracts—as the main source
material.2 As it was a postgraduate-level seminar, I expected everyone to
read the relevant chapters before class. That way, students would have
a solid and reliable account of what the law was, especially if my own
knowledge was not as deep as it could be. While not a short book at over
1000 pages, the text did present itself as a somewhat succinct introduction
for law students. It would be fair to say that McCamus took a reasonably
traditional approach to his expository task. He framed discussion around
leading cases and laid out a general framework for understanding those
cases. In this regard, it was standard fare, albeit executed with genuine
elegance, scholarly clarity and incisive analysis. However, in equal
measure, McCamus’s book highlighted the weaknesses and strengths of
contract doctrine as well as a formalistic approach to it; he was alert to
the work-in-progress character of the law and its various shadings and

2.
John D McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 2nd ed (Toronto, ON: Irwin Law, 2012). I should
declare that I consider John to be a long-time colleague and friend. He was my first Dean and has
always been unfailingly supportive of me and my critical work (even when he thought I was flat wrong
or wrong-headed).
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missteps. This made my own self-imposed unlearning enterprise both a
little easier and a little harder.
It was easier in that I did not have to offer my own reading of the
cases and defend them as reasonable and part of the received professional
wisdom; McCamus’s text did an excellent job of this. It anchored the
course and meant that I did not have to spend too much time laying out
or defending my “descriptive” reading of cases and the application of
general principles. Instead, I could spend my time offering more critical
contexts and frameworks within which to read the cases, appreciate the
standard renditions of them, and apply them to new situations. I could
largely escape the frequent claim from students that my reading of the
cases was already skewed and simply a set-up for my own political views
about law and life.
But McCamus’s straight-up presentation also made my teaching a
little more difficult. In spite of McCamus’s efforts to map out a clear path
through the doctrinal forest, he struggled to do that successfully. This
was not because of any failing on his part. It was because, although cases
are the only guide available, they offer indeterminate and occasionally
conflicting guidance. Some strike out on a clear road, others get diverted
down alleys and cul-de-sacs, some trail off into nowhere, and still others
go round in circles. In his efforts to be clear and instructive, McCamus
captures these false starts and wrong turnings. Indeed, it is hard not to
leave his formidable exegesis with the impression that the law of contracts
is less a helpful map for the confused and more a mystery tour in which no
one knows where they are going and what is around the next bend. While
it might be going too far to say that McCamus’s text reflects the truth of
Tennyson’s well-known depiction of the “lawless science of our law,/ That
codeless myriad of precedent,/ That wilderness of single instances,”3 it
leaves the reader with a definite sense of unease about the determinacy
of contract’s legal doctrine. His book is as much about a lingering faith in
the common law and its propensity to get it right, whatever its occasional
appearance, as being more in the business of hope than conviction.
All this made my unlearning task more difficult. My anticipation had
been that McCamus’s text would work as a fixed point against which I
could offer my own views and create a kind of critical tension between
his text and me. As I have stated, that proved not to be the case. His own
analysis was too soft and mushy to work as any kind of solid template. Of
course, in a different way, this was all music to my critical ears. Even the
traditional approach à la McCamus was far less certain and determinate in
3.

Lord Tennyson, Aylmer’s Field (1793).
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its doctrinal renderings than I had previously assumed. While this scotched
my plan to set up a traditional yin to my more oppositional yang, it did
pave the way for me to get across my own take on law and contract law.
In teaching the class, therefore, I felt a certain need to recalibrate, if not
abandon, the essentials of my critical law-is-politics approach to law, legal
thinking and teaching.4
In contrast to what some think, I am not of the view that legal doctrine
is chaos all the time nor that there are no good judicial decisions. My
approach recognizes a mix of determinacy and indeterminacy. To use a
Hartian metaphor, there is at any moment a core of determinacy and a
penumbra of indeterminacy.5 This is not a novel or eye-opening conclusion.
But what gives it a more unsettling and radical edge is that the relation
between the core and penumbra is itself always fragile, contingent and
on the move. Today’s core of determinacy is tomorrow’s penumbra of
indeterminacy and vice-versa. It is not simply that there is always the real
possibility that there is a Donoghue-like revolution around the next corner,
but that any part of the legal doctrine is vulnerable to being destabilized
and thereby re-configured at any time. Indeed, the law is never simply
there, but requires creative interpretation and re-interpretation: it must be
appreciated that law’s normal condition is a state of constant about-tobe, not already-is. In this way, the interpretation of legal doctrine can be
understood as both constrained and unconstrained in equal measure. In
short, as McCamus’s text unintentionally shows, there is nothing given or
fixed about legal doctrine; it is in a constant state of flux whose next shift
is as unpredictable as the English weather.
A similar story can be told about individual cases. No case can be
declared to be right or wrong on the basis of law’s internal logic or any
related formal standard. In this sense, the law is whatever a judge says
it is as long as that ruling is adopted by other judges; there is no right
or wrong that stands apart from its substantive merits or appeal at that
particular time and in that context. It follows that labelling a decision
as right or wrong is simply another way of saying that its substantive
merit or tilt appeals to the commentator’s own philosophical, political or
social commitments. Perhaps more generously, the decision will be right
if it does not clash or deviate from those commitments too significantly.
Rightness or wrongness is an external, not an internal marker; it entails a
4.
The most concise and, dare I say, balanced statement of my account of law and judicial decisionmaking can be found in Allan C Hutchinson, Toward an Informal Account of Legal Interpretation
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
5.
HLA Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” (1958) 71:4 Harv L Rev 593 at
607-615.
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selective evaluation that will vary from one commentator to another and
from one context to another. So, stating that a specific decision is right is
another way of saying that you prefer the directional potential of the case
over other possible political directions. Teaching Contract law made me
re-learn that anew.
II. A matter of course
So much of contemporary jurisprudential thinking has been side-tracked
by abstract and esoteric concerns. It remains transfixed by the positivist/
naturalist debate over whether law has a necessary moral element such
that it ceases to be law if it drifts too far away from that informing moral
content. This positivist/naturalist divide has done more harm than good
in legal education; it has syphoned off talent and effort (including too
much of my own) in a largely academic navel-gazing enterprise. Rather
than criticize or defend that speculative proposition, it might be better to
examine the actual moral content of the law and to debate its merits and
worth. So, rather than remain aloof from law’s actual history and social
performance, it will look at how and why law has the moral content that
it has at particular times and in specific legal processes. This is no small
task. Nevertheless, its confrontation will offer considerable insight into the
more general relationship between law and morality in both practical and
theoretical terms.
My self-imposed brief in the new course was to pursue this
jurisprudential angle. The course began by exploring the different ideas
about what an obligation is and what it entails. The class debated what
moral or social obligations people might have and what that tells us about
ourselves as a society. Obviously, there were many different views about
what these obligations were, the force they had over individuals, and
the consequences of neglecting or breaking them. This led neatly into
a discussion about what differentiates legal and moral obligations. The
beauty of this question in a Contracts course is that it “obliges” the class
to appreciate that law is not always or primarily about institutionalized
or formal sanctions: the Austinian idea of “law as coercion” had little
relevance. By and large, contract law relies upon people’s willingness
to act in line with moral and social expectations rather than the looming
presence of legally-enforced consequences. Not only are most contracts
kept as a matter of moral conscience, but also nothing normally happens
by way of legal sanction if people break contracts, especially if those
contracts are of an inter-personal as opposed to commercial nature.
I directed the class’s attention to why some moral or social obligations
are and are not converted into legal obligations. This kind of inquiry is
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distinct from the positivist/naturalist one because it requires students to
look at historically-specific situations. A focal point for discussions around
this issue was Lord Atkin’s prefatory statement in Donoghue that “acts
or omissions which any moral code would censure cannot in a practical
world be treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them to
demand relief.” He proceeds to observe that “in this way rules of law arise
which limit the range of complaints and the extent of their remedy.”6 Not
surprisingly, Atkin does not help that more general inquiry by bothering
to explain how that crucial process occurs or should occur. He satisfies
himself with simply concluding that a general moral duty to love one’s
neighbour translates into a legal duty not to harm one’s neighbour. The
acceptance of this principle by the legal community and its continuing
importance to tort law confirms that Atkin had a genuine sense of not only
what counted as a good moral compass, but also the readiness of the legal
community to embrace such a principle in the early 1930s.7
It is too much to ask or expect that there is an established or even
acknowledged common law method for deciding when and how to turn
moral obligations into legal ones. To do so would suggest that the operation
and development of the common law is more measured and mechanical
than it is. However, it remains productive to inquire into whether there
are any trends to the law’s practice of crystalizing moral obligations into
legal rules or principles and incorporating them into its doctrinal fabric.
In contracts law, this occurrence is frequent and undeniable. Indeed,
contracts law is one of the primary areas that has made a habit of reflecting
and taking on-board commercial and customary practices. However, it is
not at all easy or obvious to generalize about when and why that is done
or ignored. In this regard (and many others), the common law remains a
somewhat mysterious process that is celebrated and criticized in almost
equal measure. As well, this sense of mystery seems to be embraced rather
dispelled.
That said, two examples give a good sense of the connection between
contract law and changing moral and commercial values. Since the mid1960s, courts have taken more seriously the challenge to go beyond the
formal façade of contracts made and look at their substantive fairness.
Courts have been prepared to step in where stronger parties have taken
advantage of weaker parties to implement terms and conditions that favour
them. Even if there is an appearance of voluntary consent by a traditional
6.
Donoghue v Stevenson, [1932] AC 562 at 580, 1932 SLT 317 [Donoghue].
7.
See Allan C Hutchinson, Is Eating People Wrong?: Great Legal Cases and how they Shaped the
World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 115-141.
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analysis, there has been an increased willingness to explore the difficult
terrain between unconscionable actions and “bad bargains.” Indeed, this
tension is an underlying theme of modern contract law—how and where
to draw the line between contracts that are based on inequitable behaviour
(and, therefore, voidable) and those that are simply a poor choice by the
disadvantaged party (and are, therefore, enforceable). This is especially
pertinent in regard to exclusion clauses in a world of standard-form
contracts.8
Another recent intervention is in the area of “good faith”—to what
extent must contracting parties adhere, if at all, to standards of decency
and honesty in performing their contracts? Although Canadian courts have
hinted at that for some time, a move towards introducing such a standard
occurred only a few years ago in Bhasin. In a move reminiscent of Atkin in
Donoghue, the Supreme Court’s Tom Cromwell (a former law professor)
looked deep into the recent past of contract law and glimpsed a principle,
not a rule or implied term, that “underpins and is manifested in more
specific legal doctrines and may be given different weight in different
situations.”9 He defended such an innovation on the basis that it would “put
in place a duty that is just, that accords with the reasonable expectations
of commercial parties, and that is sufficiently precise that it will enhance
rather than detract from commercial certainty.”10 Although there is still
much to be worked out about the scope and implications of such a duty, so
that it does not “veer into a form of ad hoc judicial moralism or ‘palm tree’
justice,” 11 it offers evidence of how the courts are prepared to look beyond
the established and formalistic law of contracts and take a less laissez-faire
stance. That said, there is no indication from the Court about exactly when
and where it might be prepared to incorporate changing social values and
commercial norms into contract law.
In more generalized jurisprudential terms, these developments offer
strong, if inconclusive evidence of the doctrinal process through which
legal doctrine does not develop in line with some internal coherence of
contract law or contract theorizing, but evolves with the pushes and pulls
of external economic, social and political factors. Never too far ahead and
never too far behind conventional wisdom, the law follows a path that
seeks to balance the perceived need to retain some semblance of doctrinal
integrity with the undeniable imperative to respond to social demands
8.
9.
10.
11.

See eg Hunter Engineering Co v Syncrude Canada Ltd, [1989] 1 SCR 426, 57 DLR (4th) 321.
Bhasin v Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 at para 64.
Ibid at para 34.
Ibid at para 70.
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and moral expectations. The post-pandemic situation will surely place
considerable pressure on courts to reconsider the merit of accepted legal
doctrines and rules. Again, while there is no discernible pattern to this
interactive process, it behooves jurists to spend more time trying to fathom
the interactional dynamics of law and morality than wasting valuable
intellectual resources in the vain pursuit of identifying the inescapable
minimum of moral content, if any, for something to vouchsafe the validity
of law.12
III. A change of expectations
The challenge throughout the course was how to talk about civil obligations
without simply dividing it up between the familiar categories of contracts
and torts. The power of this bifurcation cannot be overestimated; it
forces interactions into dichotomous categories, it influences the working
assumptions in play in each, and it skews analysis by supposing that each
operates in isolation from the other. This division of civil obligations
has a deep and confining hold on the legal intellect and imagination: it
is extremely difficult to tackle civil obligations through a lens that is not
already filtered and distorted by those traditional and competing prisms of
legal thought.13
Perhaps the most startling insight that comes from studying contract
and tort law in tandem is that contracts are as likely to diminish people’s
interests and expectations as they are to enhance them. By this, I mean
that contrary to the assumptions of most contract cases and scholarly
commentary, parties who enter into contracts are already embedded
within an existing context of legal entitlements and duties. To begin with,
few parties actually negotiate contracts. Outside of commercial settings,
contracting is a “like-it-or-lump-it” affair; a party either signs on to a
standard form contract or has to walk away. That contract will be lopsided
in its reach and effects; ordinary people’s interests are placed as a distinct
second to those of corporate merchants or producers. Most contracts today
include an array of terms and conditions (eg liability waivers, compulsory
arbitration, and liability caps) that work against ordinary people. As such,
the age of contracts as a laissez-faire domain, if it ever existed, is now the
stuff of historical nostalgia.14

12. See discussion at 5-6, above.
13. For a standard analysis of similarities and differences between contract and tort, see Ken Oliphant
& Vanessa Wilcox, “England and Wales” in Miquel Martin-Casals, ed, The Borderlines of Tort Law:
Interactions With Contract Law (Intersentia Publishers, 2019).
14. See Patrick S Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford University Press, 1979).
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Notwithstanding this, it is simply incorrect to assume, as most judges
and commentators in contract law do, that contract-makers come to the
table as strangers and only take on mutual legal duties and responsibilities
to each other on the coming into existence of a contractual arrangement.
Since at least 1932, this has not been the case: Donoghue rejected such
a state of affairs. Up until then, most people’s and organizations’ claims
depended on there being a contract between the harmed party and the
harming party. As the dissenting Lord Buckmaster bluntly phrased it in
Donoghue, “there can be no special duty attaching to the manufacture
of food apart from that implied by contract or imposed by statute.”15
However, Atkin (and his majority colleagues) put an end to this. It was
no longer the case that manufactures owed no duties to consumers or
that those consumers were unprotected without having a contract with
the manufacturer or supplier. Henceforth, for manufacturers to owe
duties, and for consumers to be protected, no contract was needed. The
fact that people and organizations interacted within the expanding and
encompassing social context of neighbour-like relations was sufficient to
impose duties and to confer protections.
When people and organizations stand on the edge of initiating
contractual agreements, they already possess a collection of inchoate
rights and obligations that will affect and substantiate any interaction
that they plan or that happens. So when a present-day Mrs. Donoghue
prepares to obtain or consume a ginger beer (or a product, service, etc),
she can do so confident in the knowledge that she already has some basic
protections in place. Conversely, the Stevensons of the world know that
when they provide someone with a ginger beer (or a product, service,
etc), they already owe considerable duties to that person whether or not a
contract exists. Crucially, whether or not value is received or given for the
ginger beer (or a product, service, etc), those tort rights and obligations
between the Donoghues and the Stevensons are already structuring their
relationship and interactions. Accordingly, the formation of a contact
between two parties does not fill a previously empty legal void with a
freshly created set of rights and obligations. The resulting contract and its
embodied terms and conditions of performance work within and against
the framework of existing tort rights and obligations. In short, contracts
vary as much as initiate parties’ duties and entitlements.
In other words, people and organizations go about their business with a
dormant set of tort rights and obligations in their back pocket. When those
people and organizations come together and interact, they can activate
15.

Donoghue, supra note 6 at 577.
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these rights and rely on them to shape and structure their interactions.
Those existing rights are floating in readiness around the contractual
encounter and are waiting to be brought into action or kept out. If Mrs.
Donoghue now walked into an updated Wellmeadow Café and bought or
was gifted a ginger beer, she would be reasonably well protected against
there being a dead snail in her bottle. Moreover, any contract that she
entered into with either Thomas Minchella, the Café’s owner, or Stevenson
would not necessarily grant her more or better rights. In such a scenario,
the effect of a contract between the parties will be to vary their existing
legal obligations and rights in torts either by reducing them or building
on them. They reduce them by, for instance, limiting damages claimable;
they build on them by, for instance, introducing higher standards of care.
But whatever they do, and whether they do it deliberately or through
ignorance, the contracting parties work against a backdrop of potential
tort rights and liabilities.
None of this means that contracts necessarily or always limit the rights
of parties to them. Of course, Mrs. Donoghue or her friend have no right
to demand that someone give them a ginger beer (or a product, service,
etc). There is no general duty under the common law to act for the benefit
of another in tort; there might be some special duty owed to provide a
drink if there was a pre-existing relationship between the two parties that
placed a paternalistic or supervisory duty on one to provide the necessities
of life to the other.16 But this general lack of duty is the case because there
is no relationship that has yet arisen. Once the parties begin the process
of inquiring about supplying or receiving a ginger beer, the situation
changes. Whether by gift or contract, obligations begin to arise as in any
other circumstances. However, the central point remains valid—contracts
do not create duties and entitlements where none existed before; they vary
an already in-place and developed set of mutual rights and duties.
The perversity of all this is that people might be better off without
contracts. If Mrs. Donoghue’s friend had now entered the Wellmeadow
Café, she would already have a set of tort rights against Minchella and
Stevenson and they would have obligations to her about the quality of
any ginger beer that she might be given or consume. Of course, to obtain
the ginger beer in the first place, the friend would have had to enter into
a contract and pay for the ginger beer. Whether she bought the ginger
beer and entered a contract with Minchella (or even Stevenson) would not
in itself have wiped out, sidelined or rendered nugatory those rights and
16. In Canadian law, there are a growing number of exceptions to this general principle. See Childs
v Desormeaux, 2006 SCC 18.

Teaching Civil Obligations (Or What I Learned
About Law, Legal Thinking and Teaching)

333

expectations. As was decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in Checo,
a party may sue in contract or tort and choose whichever is the more
advantageous course to take; the plaintiff can avoid certain limitations (eg,
a lower standard, cap on damages or limitation period) in the contract,
“except where the contract indicates that the parties intended to limit
or negative the right to sue in tort.”17 Mindful that many standard-form
contracts reduce or cap legal liability, the friend might well be giving up
more than she is gaining by entering such a contract. Indeed, she might be
worse off than Mrs. Donoghue when it comes to recovering a range and
amount of damages.
One significant drawback of making a tort claim is whether it is
possible to sue for the discounted value of the ginger beer—could Mrs.
Donoghue (as opposed to her contracting friend) recover the difference
between the price paid for the ginger beer and, now as its owner, its reduced
worth in its contaminated state? The big difference is that tort offers no
relief or compensation when a product is simply shoddy in design and
manufacture; there is no right to get any money back. However, that might
not be the case if there are secondary losses associated with the shoddiness
of the product. In Junior Books, the House of Lords allowed a factory to
sue a flooring sub-contractor for a defective floor, even though the floor
was not a danger to anyone; it simply prevented the factory from running
its sophisticated machinery on it. The House of Lords soon backed off this
in D & F Estates Ltd as being a doctrinal overreach and held that the case
did not establish any general principle of recovery.18 However, Canadian
courts have allowed recovery in such circumstances where the defective
product presented a physical danger to others if it was not repaired.19
All in all, the Civil Obligations seminar allowed me to consolidate
and clarify ideas about the relationship of contract and tort law. As long as
these courses are taught separately, little attention will be given (and has
been given) to that crucial dynamic. Each will be presumed to operate in
its own universe with only nodding and occasional reference being made
to the other. This is not only unfortunate, but also will lead to a large gap in
understanding people’s more general rights and obligations. In particular,
a major feature of the law’s development and handling of civil obligations
17. BG Checo International Ltd v British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, [1993] 1 SCR 12
at 26, 99 DLR (4th) 577, Justices La Forest and McLachlin. See also Henderson v Merrett Syndicates
Ltd, [1995] 2 AC 145, [1994] 3 WLR 761; Deloitte & Touche v Livent Inc, 2017 SCC 63.
18. See Junior Book Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd, [1983] 1 AC 520, [1982] 3 WLR 477; D & F Estates Ltd
v Church Commissioners for England, [1989] AC 177; [1988] WLR 368.
19. See eg Winnipeg Condominium Corporation No 36 v Bird Construction Co, [1995] 1 SCR 85,
121 DLR (4th) 193.

334 The Dalhousie Law Journal

will be overlooked. In short, there has been a complete turn-around since
Donoghue—before 1932, contract law was the governing and default
regime for civil obligations; since 1932, tort law is now the primary source
for civil obligations that can be varied by contracts.
IV. Making it work
If your entry into the world of contract law was through law school (as it
is for almost all lawyers), you would take for granted that its legal doctrine
was a prized product of the common law. Generated and shaped over many
years and through many cases, these rules and principles are often passed
off as a harmonious whole that reflect and instantiate, if not an underlying
theory, at least a coherent framework of values and ideas. Such norms and
prescriptions are generally understood to be derived from and driven by a
need to facilitate trade and commerce: they are not intended to present a
partial and particular ideology that comprises various contested social and
economic strands. However, although it should not, it will likely come as a
surprise to many that these claims are, at best, disputable, if not downright
wrong. Not only is the legal doctrine of contract law based upon a general
set of definite political assumptions and commitments, but they are also
of marginal relevance as compared with the legislative regimes (and their
different social and political underpinnings) that govern large segments of
contractual arrangements.
First, an even cursory examination of the development of contract law
over the past few years reveals that it chops and changes. It certainly defies
any scholarly claim that it articulates and refines some internal logic or
sense of doctrinal integrity.20 So, any effort to understand contract (or tort)
rules as being a set of norms that arise entirely as a result of intellectual
concerns and considerations is a non-starter. If there is any pattern or trend
to legal doctrine (and that is a large “if”), then it will have to be found
outside the law and in the wiles and workings of the economic arena. For
example, Hadley v Baxendale’s formulation of the rules and remoteness
of damage has a more compelling, if not always liked, explanation when
it is situated in the social context of mid-19th Century England; it was
considered important to limit the liability of the fledgling transport
industry as the economy became more national and, therefore, in need
of a more viable and extensive network of transportation.21 There are few
textbooks or commentaries that incorporate this elementary insight into

20. See discussion at 4-5, above.
21. See Richard Danzig, “Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law” (1975)
4:2 J Leg Stud 249.
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an explanation for legal doctrine; it is considered more as an “isn’t-itinteresting” aside.
Second, the political orientation of contract law has resulted in much
of what was traditionally considered to be in the domain of contract law
being taken out of the controlling and responsible hands of judges and
the common law process. Instead, disenchanted by the political leanings
of judges and lawyers, legislators have fashioned alternative governing
regimes that are more in line with modern political sensibilities; these
include labour and employment, insurance, insolvency, marriage and
divorce, and sale of goods. This state of affairs is the direct outcome of the
common law’s persistence in embodying (at the same time as it is denying
that it is beholden to) a more individualistic and laissez-faire ideology.
Moreover, the shift from the common law to legislated regulation has
been so pervasive that the pedagogic representation of the common law
as being at the heart of the overall scheme for regulating contractual and
contract-like behaviour is no longer accurate or defensible. There are few
areas of the private law of contract that have not been superseded by more
publicly-inclined systems of organization and norm-making. As such, the
overwhelming existence and operation of statutory schemes stand as official
monuments to the marginal and largely rejected merit of the common law
of contract. Teaching this seminar re-taught me that neglecting such an
appreciation is close to willful and perpetuates a troubling ideology, if
only by default.
A revealing example of how this occurs is the infamous case of Christie.
Fred Christie was a Canadiens’ hockey fan and a season-ticket holder at
the Montreal Forum. When he tried to order a beer at the Forum’s bar in
the late 1930s, the bartender refused to serve him: the assistant manager
explained that the establishment “extended no courtesy to negroes.”
Humiliated and angry, Christie brought an action against the Forum. The
case went all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada. By a four to one
majority, the Court held that Christie’s claim for discrimination failed. For
the majority, Justice Thibaudeau Rinfret asserted that freedom of contract
was the order of the day: “any merchant is free to deal as he may choose
with any individual member of the public” and that “it is not a question
of motives or reasons for deciding to deal or not to deal; he is free to do
either.”22 There could be no greater affirmation of the law of contracts’
basic and dominant commitment—a person’s freedom of contract. For the
common law, this freedom trumps all other values; the private right of
individuals to contract when, how and with whom they choose is more
22.

Christie v The York Corporation, [1940] SCR 139 at 142, [1940] 1 DLR 81.
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important than any public commitment to disallowing racial discrimination
or similar actions. Courts persist in treating social legislation as something
that has to be read in strict terms so that it does not trespass too much and
too destructively into the common law. Despite denials to the contrary, this
involves taking a political stand, both substantively and institutionally, on
a grand and undeniable scale.
The dissent in Christie by Justice Henry Davis offers confirmation of
the common law’s general view of the relationship between the common
law and legislation both institutionally and politically. He maintained that,
whatever the general rule of commerce might be, there was an exception
if the government, as in this situation, had given “the licensee…what is in
the nature of a quasi monopolistic right which involves a corresponding
duty to sell to the public.”23 However, as the Quebec government had
not included any legislative power to discriminate, Davis concluded that
the bar could not refuse to serve all customers as long as they could pay
for a drink. In this way, Davis runs a contrary line to that of his judicial
colleagues and the common law mind-set generally. For him, legislation
was not something to be marginalized and relegated to a distinctly secondplace position in calibrating people’s civil obligations. He would see less
changes to the majority’s approach today than he might have surmised.
This recalcitrance of today’s judges to abandon the 19th Century rules
and rationales of contract law is still on display. Each alteration to settled
doctrine is done with a tentative and almost begrudging reluctance. The
doctrine of consideration is a classic example of how the common law
works or, perhaps from a certain viewpoint, how it does not work. The
general explanation for this doctrinal turn of events is that it is now much
too late in the day for the common law to do away with consideration in
contract law and that any substantial transformation will need to be done
by way of legislative reform. This is both baffling and typical. When it
suits the courts, they are more than willing to abandon root-and-branch
all manner of rules and principles. The most famous illustration of this
is, of course, Donoghue’s introduction of the tort of negligence and the
imposition of civil liability in the absence of contractual relations. On
other occasions, the courts have lamented the state of legal doctrine, but
claimed to be unable to do anything about it.
Whatever the original rationale for the consideration requirement,
the courts have spent more than half a century whittling away at its
provisions and requirements.24 While consideration is still considered a
23.
24.

Ibid at 150.
For a general survey of consideration, see McCamus, supra note 2 at 215-280. For an interesting
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sine qua non of contract validity, the courts have bent over backwards
to find consideration in all manner of far-from-obvious circumstances
and settings: more weight has been placed on the “intention to create
legal relations.”25 So, the present situation is that an agreement must
have consideration if it is to be granted a legal status, but almost any
combination of benefit and detriment between promisor and promisee,
no matter how contrived or counter-intuitive, will be sufficient. On the
basis of transparency and candour alone, courts should be spared from
having to make “fictional attempts to find consideration.”26 Instead, a more
honest and transparent handling of consideration as an essential feature of
contract law is demanded.
As well as the doctrine of consideration, a stand-out example of the
Canadian courts’ self-imposed incapacity to reform long-established legal
doctrine is the appalling state of the rules that govern the assessment of
damages in personal injury cases. Despite being highly critical of those
rules, the Supreme Court continues to hide behind the canard that “there
is the long-established principle that in a constitutional democracy it is the
legislature, as the elected branch of government, which should assume
the major responsibility for law reform.”27 Mindful that judges can and
do make bold moves that force or pre-empt legislators’ intervention (with
Donoghue again being the prime example), this selective judicial timidity
does no favours to the already-dubious integrity of the common law process;
incremental change is still law-making and law-changing, especially when
it eviscerates the very doctrine that it is claiming to be refining. Further, the
kind of doctrinal shell-game involved in the modern doctrinal shaping of
contractual consideration severely dents the legitimacy of the common law
as a mode of legal decision-making.
Conclusion
So my decision to teach the Civil Obligations class was not another instance
of poor judgment, at least from my own perspective; the students may have
come to a different conclusion. Considering the relatively short duration of
the course, there was much that I learned, unlearned and re-learned about
law, legal thinking, and teaching. In retrospect, it was a better decision
and experience than I could have expected. It forced me to recognize

take on the history and rationale of consideration, see Bruce MacDougall, “Consideration and
Estoppel: Problem and Panacea” (1992) 15:2 Dal LJ 265.
25. See Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd, [1991] 1 QB 1, [1990] 2 WLR 1153.
26. Greater Fredericton Airport Authority Inc v NAV Canada, 2008 NBCA 28 at para 29, Robertson
JA.
27. See eg Watkins v Olafson, [1989] 2 SCR 750 at 760-761, 61 DLR (4th) 577, McLachlin J.
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the challenges that less experienced colleagues face in their early days
of law teaching. Perhaps more significantly, in re-thinking and re-visiting
some deeper issues on the jurisprudential agenda, I challenged my own
long-unexamined assumptions about law’s development and its claims
to moral approval. Finally, teaching Civil Obligations opened me up to
the powerful, if under-appreciated effect that legal classification has upon
lawyers’ and law professors’ understanding of discrete legal principles and
doctrines; there is a tendency to work in isolated disciplinary silos and
intellectual strait-jackets.

